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The assertion that conventional arrest law and
constitutional limitations unduly restrict police
activity is as old as our history. With the increases
in crime rates which have accompanied the development of modem urban civilization, the demands to accord the police more flexibility for
action have grown steadily more insistent.
Since the so-called Uniform Arrest Act was
first proposed in 1942, much of this controversy
has centered upon a provision of that act which
would authorize a policeman to "stop any person
abroad who he has reasonable ground to suspect
is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name,
address, business abroad and whither he is going."'
Such a stopping would constitute not an "arrest"
but a "detention," and the detention could be
continued for two hours to permit further investigation. During that time the suspect could be
searched for dangerous weapons.
The questions before us at this session of the
conference are clearly based on this act. In an
important aspect, however, one of the questions
posed is more explicit than the act. This particular
question asks whether the police should be permitted to search a detained person not only for
weapons but also for other "incriminating evidence." In this discussion I intend to treat together the Uniform Act and the question framed
for us.
The key question put for this session provides:
"In the absence of sufficient grounds for an
arrest, should the police have a right to stop
and question a person as to his identity and
reason for being where he is, if the appearance
or conduct of that person has reasonably aroused
police suspicion?"
The fine hand of the advocate can be detected
I Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. RFv.

315 (1942).

in the deceptively sImple formulation of this proposal. It carefully sugar-coats a proposition which,
if accepted, would severely curtail individual
rights in rejecting one of our oldest legal traditions
and which, at least in part, is almost certainly
unconstitutional. Like any good advocate's question, it is so worded that it seems to compel the
desired answer. The proposal purports to authorize
only "reasonable" police action-the custody of
one who has "reasonably aroused police suspicion."
Thus one who answers "No" is placed in the position of throttling "reasonable" police activity.
The catch, of course, is that the word "reasonable"
as used in this proposal and in the Uniform Arrest
Act has a meaning all its own.
In the law of arrest and by long consititutional
history, "reasonable" has been interpreted as the
equivalent of probable cause. An officer acts reasonably if, on the facts before him, it would appear
that the suspect has probably committed a specific
crime. This is the context in which the word is
used in the fourth amendment and in most state
arrest laws. Our cases sharply distinguish the
reasonableness of an arrest on probable cause from
unreasonable apprehension grounded on "mere"
suspicion. It might appear, therefore, that the
detention provision of the Uniform Arrest Act in
the proposal before us is wholly innocuous-an
officer can act on reasonable suspicion, i.e., probable cause, which of course he can do anyway without any change in the law.
In a very recent case construing the Uniform
Arrest Act's detention provision, the Delaware
Supreme Court made such an equation. Apparently unaware of what it was doing to the act in
the process, the court uttered the following dictum:
"We can find nothing in 11 Del.C., § 1902
[detention provisioni which infringes on the
rights of a citizen to be free from detention
except, as appellant says, 'for probable cause'.
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Indeed, we think appellant's attempt to draw
a distinction between an admittedly valid detention [conventional arrest] upon 'reasonable
ground to believe' and the requirement of
§ 1902 of 'reasonable ground to suspect' is a semantic quibble.... In this context, the words
'suspect' and 'believe' are equivalents." 2
Such a construction of the Uniform Arrest Act,
of course, saves its constitutionality at the expense
of negating its whole purpose. Clearly this is intended neither by the act, the objective of which
was to increase and not just to restate police power,
nor by the topic before us, which postulates "In
the absence of sufficient grounds for arrest...",
i.e., without probable cause. The word "reasonable" as a qualifier of suspicion in these proposals
must be understood to indude at least part of
what would be unreasonable under present law.
It is perhaps poetic justice that this little deception has backfired in its first court test. In any
event, a more accurate posing of the question
before us would be: "Should a policeman be allowed to stop and detain even if his action would
be unreasonable under the fourth amendment or
the common law of arrest?"
Along with this misleading use of the term
"reasonable" is another semantic sleight of hand
which tends to obscure the real nature of the proposed change. The chief draftsman of the Uniform
Arrest Act has stipulated (and our topic implies)
that this stopping for questioning and search
"is not an arrest" but is merely a detention. One
can certainly understand the wish which has
fathered this attempted distinction, for "arrest"
is a blunt word, implying stigma and dramatizing
the instant at which the liberty of the citizen is
totally subjected to the power of the state. It has
been our boast that under a democratic form of
government such awesome power can be exercised only on reasonable belief, i.e., probable cause,
and that this limitation constitutes a key link in
the protection of the subject's liberty. It is no
wonder, therefore, that the authors have attempted
to soften the sharp image of their proposed change
with a semantic curtain. They would have us
believe that a taking into custody for questioning
and search is not an arrest but something else, as
if a change in the descriptive label of a concept
effects a change in the nature of the concept itself.
This is Madison Avenue at its best, but it is hard
2

De Salvatore v. State, No. 68, 1959 Term, Delaware
Supreme Court, June 3, 1960.

to see how it advances the cause of legal analysis
of this proposal on its merits.
The most commonly accepted definition of an
arrest, a definition which is incorporated even
in the Uniform Arrest Act, is "the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense."' 3 Custody is "an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested," which occurs at the moment
an individual is no longer a free agent to do as he
pleases. The Constitution does not use the word
"arrest" but expresses the same idea in its reference to "seizure," an even more unambiguous
word. A seizure or arrest can be and often is of
short duration, and of course the fact whether it
is regarded or recorded by the police as an arrest
is irrelevant. To determine whether an arrest has
taken place we look at the facts to see if there has
been "an actual restraint of the person." Often
this is not easy to determine, as where an officer
says to a pedestrian, "Just a minute, I want to
ask you a few questions." Were a civilian to ask
such a question there would certainly be no restraint, but what on their face are merely words of
request take on color from the officer's uniform,
badge, gun and demeanor. The Uniform Arrest
Act, however, is unambiguous; the officer can
enforce his request by forceably restraining for
up to two hours the suspect against whom there
is no probable cause.
Under the definition of arrest given above, the
only way in which such a restraint of a criminal
suspect can be viewed as a nonarrest is to quibble
over the qualifying phrase, ".... in order that he
may be forthcoming to answer for the commission
of an offense." The most reasonable interpretation
of this language would be that it merely distinguishes a restraint the purpose of which is related
to the enforcement of the criminal law from the
seizure of a lost child in order to return it to its
parents, the enforcement of quarantine measures,
or the detention of a mentally ill person who requires care and treatment.
There is, however, another possible interpretation which can be found from the bare words alone,
if one disregards obvious policy considerations,
common sense and a voluminous case law. Hundreds of tort cases to the contrary notwithstanding, many police officers profess to believe that
3 ALI CODE or CRzNnAL PRocEDm §18 (1931).
For the same definition in the Uniform Act, see Warner,
supra note 1, at 344.

CALEB FOOTE

they have not "arrested" their prisoner until they
have formally booked him on the police blotter.
In the recent celebrated Apalachin case in New
York, Judge Kaufman gives his judicial weight
to this view:
"It is dear that a technical arrest demands
an intent on the part of the arresting officer to
bring in a person so that he might be put through
the steps preliminary to answering for a crime
'4
such as fingerprinting, booking, arraigning, etc."
He then proceeds to try to square this belief with
the fourth amendment by stating that "it cannot
be contended that every detention of an individual" is a seizure in the constitutional sense. As
the Apalachin case involved a roundup and detention of alleged Mafia conspirators, Judge Kaufman was presumably not referring to non-criminal
child welfare or contagious disease detentions, as
to which his statement would of course be true.
Aside from a misrepresentation of British law,5 he
cites no authority for these sweeping assertions.
It is apparent, however, that such a construction
is absurd, for inasmuch as it makes the officer's
intent the controlling factor, it would substitute
the policeman for court and law as a protector
of liberty. Seizures or arrests without probable
cause would be illegal only if the officer ultimately
entered a formal charge of crime on insufficient
evidence; he would be within the law if the suspect
were released after imprisonment without having
been booked, or if the period of detention turned
up probable cause through search or detention
and only then did the officer decide to book him.
The short answer to such reasoning is that if
Judge Kaufman is correct, then both our tort
law of false imprisonment and the whole law of
search and seizure developed by the United States
Supreme Court in its construction of the fourth
amendment are wrong. See, for example, Mr.
Justice Jackson's opinion for a unanimous Court
in United States v. Di Re:
"The government's last resort in support of
the arrest is to reason from the fruits of the
4United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71, 77
(S.D.N.Y.
1960).
5
Judge Kaufman cites DEVLL, THE CRDMNAL
PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 31-62 (1960), on the British

practice of questioning suspects and the operation of the
Judges' Rules. He uses this material in the context of
enforced detention for questioning but neglects to make
reference to Lord Justice Devlin's important qualification that the English police cannot use detention or
compulsion for such questioning and that "it is up to
the police to make sure that a man comes to the station" for questioning "voluntarily." Id. at 68.
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search to the conclusion that the officer's knowledge at the time gave him grounds for it. We
have had frequent occasion to point out that a
search is not made legal by what it turns up.
In law it is good or bad when it starts and does
not change character from its success." 6
In his recent book, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IN ENGLAND, Lord Justice Devlin writes of the
law from which both our common law of arrest
and the fourth amendment were drawn, and he
puts this matter very well indeed:
"The police have no power to detain anyone
unless they charge him with a specified crime
and arrest him accordingly. Arrest and imprisonment are in law the same thing. Any form of
physical restraint is an arrest and imprisonment
is only a continuing arrest. If an arrest is unjustified, it is wrongful in law and is known as
false imprisonment. The police have no power
whatever to detain anyone on suspicion or for
the purpose of questioning him. They cannot
even compel anyone whom they do not arrest
7
to-come to the police station."
I have stressed the falsity of this alleged distinction between arrest and detention because an
awareness of it is essential to a complete understanding of the nature and complexity of the proposal before us. Probable cause as a standard to
guide the police and against which to measure the
legality of an arrest or seizure is to be abandonned
in favor of some other as yet unformulated standard more favorable to the police. It is true that the
detention-arrest permitted under the Uniform
Arrest Act would be limited in duration, and that
at the end of some time period such as two hours
the arrest must be terminated unless by that time
the police have acquired sufficient evidence to
meet the conventional burden of probable cause.
But such a time limitation does not make the detention any less an arrest for the period during
which liberty is actually restrained in order to
facilitate a criminal investigation. As the standard
of probable cause is embodied in the federal and
most state constitutions, it seems to me that we
are talking about constitutional revision and not
merely statutory enactment. That of course does
nQt automatically condemn it, for I suppose not
even the fourth amendment is sacrosanct if imperative policy considerations demand its revision.
6332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
7DEVLrN, THE CRInMNAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND
68 (1960).
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Reference to this constitutional issue, however,
does point up the difficulty and gravity of the
proposal.
Underlying this whole discussion is the premise
that the police as presently constituted are less
effective than they should be. I suppose this is
probably true, although it is certainly not established by a high incidence of crime or low clearance rates or the number of instances in which
known criminals escape justice. In a democrary
police effectiveness is measured even more by
what the police do not do than by their positive
accomplishments:
"... the worth of a society will eventually be
reckoned not in proportion to the number of
criminals it crucifies, burns, hangs or imprisons,
but rather by the degree of liberty experienced
by the great body of its citizenry. There have
never been more determined law enforcers than
8
Nazi Germany or the Soviet.
Accepting the premise of ineffectiveness as true,
however, it does not follow that the proposed
changes in the law of arrest are a prerequisite-or
even the best way-to increased efficiency or that
such changes will have any significant effect at
all. There is a measure of cynicism in the typical
advocacy of change, implying that present law
handcuffs the police, and that essential, routine,
everyday police tactics which are now illegal should
receive the law's official sanction. The first argument assumes that the police are actually restrained from necessary action by the law, but the
second assumes action and inks for the removal of
a stigma of illegality, immunization from the
presently nominal threat of false imprisonment
actions and protection of police evidence against
the onslaught of the exclusionary rule. No doubt
in some instances the law actually has the effect
of restraining action which would solve crimes,
but to the extent that the police generally already
stop, question, search and harass along the lines
proposed in the queries to this conference, it is
hard to see how change in the law is going to have
much effect on clearance or conviction rates.
If the goal is improved law enforcement, there
are obvious alternatives to change in the law. One
would be to improve the caliber of policemen, and
it is certainly significant that the federal police
forces, which have to operate under the most
restrictive legal "handcuffs" in the nation, also
8
Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wiretapping, 103 U.PA.L.REv. 157, 158 (1954).

enjoy a relatively superior reputation for efficiency
and respect for individual rights. This would suggest that when you are willing to pay enough to
get a police force which is both adequately trained
and reasonably dissociated from politics, you can
obtain marked improvement in effectiveness. It
would also suggest that the effect of restrictive
law upon police activity may be just the opposite
of what is generally assumed. One reason that the
F.B.I. has been able to recruit a higher caliber of
personnel is the public confidence it has built for
itself by operating within the law. The same has
been said of British and Canadian police forces,
where the seed of lawful operation has led to a harvest of public respect and cooperation.
A related alternative which is less satisfactory
in the long run but may be politically more expedient is to concentrate upon an increase in the
numerical strength and supervision of a police
force instead of or in addition to efforts to improve
overall personnel quality. During the last four
months of 1954 the New York police conducted
an experiment in their 25th precinct, an area of
about one square mile with a population of 120,000
and an extremely high crime rate. The number
of patrolmen on duty was increased from 188 to
440, and the number of supervising sergeants,
from 15 to 33. Proportional increases were made
also in personnel of higher rank. Foot posts were
reduced in size to a point where the officer assigned
could reasonably be expected to observe all incidents and conditions on his post, and the men
were held closely accountable for what happened.
While the statistics are incomplete and may have
defects because of the department's self-interest
in building a case for higher appropriations, the
total number of felonies reported in the precinct
declined 55.6% from the comparable period of the
year before, while the clearance rate for felonies
rose from 20.2% to 65.6%. No comparable changes
9
were reported in the rest of the city.
The chief disadvantages of these alternatives
is that they cost money and require the exercise
of political and administrative statesmanship,
whereas enacting new arrest laws dffers the illusion
of doing something about crime without financial
or political complications and has a natural appeal
to political expediency. I suspect that in police
work, as elsewhere, one generally gets no more
than he pays for, and that legislation on police
9 NEw Yoiux Crry PouicE
(undated, probably 1955).
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power is a wholly inadequate substitute for responsible police fiscal and personnel policy.
The importance of seeking alternatives within
the present legal framework is emphasised when
one examines the impact of police arrest practices
upon our constitutional respect for privacy. The
right to be let alone-to be able sit in one's house
or drive one's car or walk the streets without unwarranted police intrusion-is surely one of the
most important factors to be weighed in achieving
a balance between individual liberty and public
necessity. Ironically, it is this factor about which
we know the least. Although they are often inadequate, we collect at least some data on the
number of crimes reported, the number of crimes
cleared by arrest, and the mortality between
charge and conviction. We also have figures purporting to state the number of persons "arrested,"
but usually this only reflects cases where the police
have booked, fingerprinted and charged the suspect. We cannot even guess at the true arrest
rate because we have no data on the number of
people whose liberty is restrained but who after
investigation are released without charge. Under
these circumstances to try to make an intelligent
evaluation of how the right of privacy fares under
present conditions and how proposed changes in
the law would affect it is very much like trying
to compute batting averages when one knows only
the number of hits for each player but has no data
on numbers of times at bat.
Only occasionally, and then usually in newspapers or other unofficial sources, do statistical
tidbits appear which cast glimmers of light. Recently, for example, the Baltimore Sun gave its
"Policeman of the Year" award to the inventor
of the "Battaglia plan."' 0 This hardly novel invention was to stop and "check" cars driven by
teenagers at night. The Sun reported that during
its first year of operation 157,000 cars were stopped
in this operation, netting "more than 1,000 arrests"
for non-traffic offenses. How many of these arrests
proved to be well grounded is not stated. Assuming a figure of 1,000, and further assuming that
the cars averaged two occupants each, the Baltimore police were making one hit for every 314
persons "checked." The nature of the checking
process is not described; for some it was doubtless
only a roadside detention, but for others additional
restraint may have been involved. In Massachu-

setts, state police stopped 400 motorists in a drive
to catch residents who were buying their holiday
cheer at cut rate New Hampshire prices and bagged
one violator, described as "an elderly, bewildered
man."" A five hour roadblock on Chicago's south
side is reported to have involved stopping 1,190
cars, with a net catch of seven persons arrested
for narcotics investigation, five suspected drunken
drivers and six drivers who did not have licenses
12
in their possession.
These are the minor surface manifestations of a
very serious problem. Of much more importance
are the spectacular round-ups of suspects after
major crimes and the routine daily investigations
of suspicious characters, loiterers, past offenders
and others deemed suspect or undesirable by
unarticulated police standards. The roadblock
affects everyone indiscriminately and probably
does not develop any focused public resentment,
but these other activities are concentrated in
poorer economic areas with high crime rates. The
police batting average here may not be as low as
in indiscriminate roadblocks, but is is probably
not very high. What does the right of privacy
mean for such people in such neighborhoods?
What proportion of the total number of arrests
is made up of persons abruptly arrested, investigated for minutes or hours or days, and as abruptly
released without booking? What is the cumulative
impact of a high ratio of mistaken "detentions"
upon police public relations and the development
of attitudes of active public cooperation with the
police? These and many other related questions.
urgently need to be answered if we are to be able
to evaluate and reassess the role the police should
play in our society. In our present state of ignorance the hypothesis that the best interests of
democratic law enforcement demand stricter compliance with the fourth amendment is at least as
plausible as the view that the standard of the
fourth amendment should be relaxed.
The last point I wish to make is that analysis of
any proposal to increase police power is handicapped because of the imprecision of what is being
proposed. After many years of discussion we are
still left very much in the dark as to precisely
what is desired by advocates of reform. I have

10Baltimore Sun, Jan. 22, 1960. See especially lead
editorial, "The Captain's Plan."
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"Boston Hearald, Dec. 22, 1959, p. 1, col. 1; id.,
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'2 See photostats of Chicago newspaper Clippings
dated Sept. 11 and 12, 1954, reproduced in CHICAGO
CLUB,
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already noted that the standard employed in the
Uniform Arrest Act and in the queries for this
session-reasonable suspicion-is meaningless if
reasonable is not equated with probable cause.
And obviously it is not; it suggests only that there
should be some undefined limitation upon the
police. If probable cause is no longer to be the
test, at least at the initial point of arrest, where
is the line to be drawn short of indiscriminate
police detentions on hunch? No greater service
could be rendered by advocates of change in the
law than the formulation of specific standards
illuminating the limits of the proposed buffer
zone which would lie between arrest on probable
cause and the protection of the individual from
intrusion based on nothing more substantial than
a policeman's hunch.
The factors suggested in this session's query
are a disturbing illustration of the difficulties of
such a formulation. An officer's impressions of a
suspect's explanation of his "identity and reason
for being where he is" are wholly subjective and
seem to suggest almost unlimited discretion in the
police. They are, moreover, reminiscent of the
elements of common law vagrancy, an outmoded
relic of feudal class distinctions which has been
grossly abused by the police in dealing with socially
and economically disadvantaged elements of our
society, but without whatever protection is afforded from the fact that vagrancy is a status
offense which in theory can be established only
by repeated observation over a period of days "or
weeks.
Most of the limited judicial opinion which could
be enlisted in support of a detention drafting project comes from automobile cases. As has been
noted, the police today can question a pedestrian
on the streets or go to a house to request an interview with a suspect. They can solicit a confession
or statement, bluff the suspect by pretending that
they already know he is carrying contraband, or
take advantage of the mere opportunity to ask
questions to induce the suspect to tip his hand.
In England the police frequently invite a suspect
to come to the police station for an interview, a
practice of which American police apparently have
not taken advantage. If such measures cause the
suspect to make an incriminating admission or to
try to dispose of incriminating evidence, an arrest
on probable cause can follow. Most of the cases,
incidentally, which are cited as purporting to
authorize a power to "stop and question" a suspect

involve an incriminating admission to an officer's
first question. They are authority for the power
to ask a question but not for a restraint of one who
declines to stop and talk. The case upon which
the so-called Maryland "accosting" rule is based,
for example, qualifies the right to question upon
lack of "coercion" by the police: "If he had been
merely passive and silent, when confronted with
the sergeant's implied accusation, he would have
been immune from any police interference until
a warrant had been procured."' 3 In his discussion
of the British practice, Lord Justice Devlin emphasizes: "But it is up to the police to make sure
that a man comes to the station voluntarily.... .,14
No doubt many people feel compelled to stop and
answer when questioned by an officer, and the
unavoidable ambiguity in such a situation operates
to the officer's advantage.
If the'suspect is in a moving automobile, however, there is no ambiguity. The officers cannot
ask a question as he drives past. They can follow
the car until it is parked or perhaps stopped by a
red light, and then approach the occupant as they
would a pedestrian; or they can forego the opportunity to question; or they can stop the car. The
last alternative is often the only practicable one,
and because the restraint involved in hailing a
car to the side of the road is much more direct
than asking a question of a pedestrian it is here
that a right of detention on something less than
probable cause would seem to be most likely to
arise. In Carroll v. United States, however, the
Court equated the stopping or interruption of a
car with a search and proscribed either except
upon probable cause:
"It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such
a search.... IT]hose lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right
to free passage without interruption or search
unless there is [probable cause]. (Emphasis
5
added.)1
The later cases of Brinegar v. United States' 6 and
Henry v. United States' 7 have also been decided on
the assumption that probable cause must exist
13Blager v. State, 162 Md. 664, 161 At. 1 (1932).
14Devlin, supra note 7, at 68.
s267 U.S. 132, 153-4 (1925).
16 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
17
361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959).
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before the car is stopped. No other justice joined
Mr. Justice Burton's concurring opinion in Brinegar suggesting the existence of an intermediate
zone which would warrant stopping a car for
questioning on evidence insufficient to justify a
search. Neither this opinion nor the few cases
which have purported to apply it are helpful as
explorations of the possible limits of such a rule,
distinguishing it from roadblocks or other random
interruptions.
Nor would the attempt to formulate standards
for detention receive much useful guidance from
discussions of hypothetical emergency situations
such as the right of the police temporarily to detain
one found near a fresh corpse, or Mr. Justice
Jackson's reference to the kidnapping of a child
after which "the officers throw a roadblock about
the neighborhood and search every outgoing
car ... ."18 Whatever the law may be in such situ-

ations, the reasonableness of the police action is
conditioned by an immediatc crisis and would
have no general application. Mr. Justice Jackson
proceeds to qualify his illustration by distinguishing a roadblock which is "the only way to save a
1 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949)
(dissenting opinion).
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threatened life and detect a vicious crime" from
"a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger."
Narrowly drawn exceptions to the requirement
of probable cause to cover such emergencies would
have great merit but would have little bearing
on the everyday police problems to which our
topic invites attention.
Those of us who believe that the fourth amendment's resolution of a very difficult problem
through the formula of probable cause is as good
a compromise as we can find are not likely to be
convinced otherwise unless we can see how a
power of arrest without probable cause would be
limited, how it would work in specific situations,
and how its proponents propose to deal with the
constitutional obstacles to its validity. In the
meantime, I am afraid that the pressing problem
which faces us in the law of arrest is not how to
find ways to increase the power of the police. If illegality in police arrests is as widespread as present evidence would suggest, and existing sanctions against it as ineffective as I believe them to
be, perhaps the appropriate queries for the next
conference would be: Can we afford to enforce
the fourth amendment and the law of arrest, and
if so, how?

